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Abstract–In late-modern societies, knowledge constitutes a ma-
jor component of any human activity. Knowledge politics—a 
field of political activities concerned with the production, appli-
cation, monitoring and control of new knowledge and know-
ledge-based technoscientific innovations—has gained impor-
tance over the last 30 years. A central term in recent knowledge 
politics is “interdisciplinarity”. The vagueness of this term, 
however, appears to be a disadvantage for any public discourse 
on goals and objectives of any specific knowledge politics. In 
addition to what has been achieved in the field of reflection on 
interdisciplinarity (ID), the aim of this paper is to provide a 
philosophical foundation for a classification and criticism of the 
innumerable usages of interdisciplinarity in present knowledge 
politics. With regard to established positions in the philosophy 
of science, different types of ID can be distinguished: the object 
type (“ontology”), the theory type (epistemology), the method 
type (methodology), and the problem / purpose type. Based on 
this classification I will show which specific type of ID is in-
volved in the NSF’s scenario on converging technologies—one 
of the most prominent kinds of knowledge politics. This type of 
interdisciplinarity will be contrasted with the research program 
of the European Commission on converging technologies. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE LATE-MODERN SHIFT  
FROM TECHNOLOGY TO KNOWLEDGE 
A few decades ago, a well-known and widely-discussed 
question was: do artifacts have politics? [1] Nowadays, since 
hybrids, quasi-objects, and non-human beings are populating 
and conquering our life-world—also, posing challenges to 
any kind of governance and public policy—, Langdon Win-
ner’s position is taken for granted. Artifacts carry inherently 
political qualities; they change social-cultural norms, diversi-
fy political actions, and in particular, revise the conditions of 
the possibility of politics. In this sense, artifacts are compa-
rable to any other kind of political actions, norms, regula-
tions and laws—but with much more far ranging impact on 
the life-world. In fact, the development and diffusion of 
technical artifacts can be regarded as a materialization of 
politics, e.g. of political decisions on various levels and in 
different kinds of institutional seetings. The various notions 
of (global and local) governance reflect the diversification of 
politics. Not only technology changes politics, and politics 
influences technology, but technology has to be considered 
as a type of politics! 
Over the last 30 years, however, the pace of the scien-
technological development has being accelerated. The ma-
terial signs and symbols of technical artifacts are vanishing.  
Non-materialized technologies, such as information and 
communication technologies, grow rapidly. Marc Weisser 
emphasizes that, “the most profound technologies are those 
that disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of 
everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.“ In-
deed, we can observe a paradigm shift in the sociotechnolog-
ical sphere: from materialized technologies to non-mate-
rialized knowledge. The more technology conquers our life-
world and the broader technology regulates our late-modern 
societies, the less we perceive it.  
A late-modern question would be: does knowledge have 
politics? While science (research) and technology (develop-
ment) politics has been around since the time of Francis Ba-
con in the early 17th century, today knowledge politic [2] is a 
central field of political activity that has gained importance  
during the last 30 years. The challenge is obvious: Know-
ledge has to be shaped—in particular, it has to be regulated 
and restricted, fostered and funded, created and constructed. 
Guidelines and criteria have to be developed. An unrestricted 
or instantaneous production, diffusion and use of new know-
ledge is no longer feasible—if it ever was. Side-, long-term 
and accumulative effects have to be taken into account. 
Risks have to be identified and public debates about risks 
have to be induced, monitored and moderated. Path decisions 
about which knowledge is desirable and acceptable have to 
be made as early as possible. Late modern societies are—
according to Ulrich Beck’s Reflexive Modernization 
theory— reflexive in the sense that we are faced with prob-
lems induced by the rapid development and distribution of 
technologies [3]. In order to cope with pressing problems, a 
need for new and better knowledge is emerging. 
Thus, knowledge politics and knowledge assessment 
seem to be more fundamental and far reaching than tradi-
tional science and technology politics: knowledge enables 
developments in science and technology within society; 
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knowledge underlies and determines the whole innovation 
process. The relevance of knowledge regulation for shaping 
the future of societies seems to be evident: Knowledge poli-
tics normatively defines and assesses the specific type of 
knowledge that seems to be most important for the future of 
society. It regulates and determines the future trajectories of 
the development of late-modern society. Shaping knowledge 
is (a central element for) building society! Knowledge poli-
tics is, of course, a product of the technological development 
itself. Ambivalent side effects have become obvious; the 
development of new technologies has turned out to be far 
more complex than in the past, e.g. time-consuming, risky, 
expensive, sensitive dependent on government regulation 
and funding. And, in addition, learning to manage non-
knowledge poses challenges to late-modern societies.  
A core term of current knowledge politics seems to be 
“interdisciplinarity” [4].  “Interdisciplinarity” is an eminently 
political term, also revealing that science has become reflex-
ive and is rapidly changing. While disciplinary knowledge 
seems to be of limited utility—pressing real-world problems 
do not fit into the established framework of disciplinary 
fragmentation—interdisciplinarity seems to be a way out in 
order to cope with misty real-world problems of our socie-
ties. A new mode of knowledge production seems to be in-
dispensable [5]. Post-industrial and late-modern knowledge 
societies [6] demand interdisciplinarity in order to facilitate 
knowledge production and processing and to ensure interna-
tional competitiveness and customer care. In other words, 
interdisciplinarity is highly valued from various perspectives. 
Thus, interdisciplinarity seems to be a marker not only to 
characterize recent sciences, but to describe societal-cultural 
changes. Obviously, late-modern knowledge societies re-
quire interdisciplinarity whereas classical-modern industrial 
societies mainly attempt to promote disciplinarity: in fact, 
late-modernity could be characterized by interdisciplinarity 
(and knowledge politics), modernity by disciplinarity (and 
technology politics).  
Let us illustrate this thesis in more detail. A prominent 
example for present-day knowledge politics of interdiscipli-
narity (for short: ID) is given by the U.S.-National Science 
Foundation (NSF). The NSF refers to ID, namely the inte-
gration and convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
information technology and cognitive science (NBIC) [7]. 
Here, ID should guarantee technological innovation by a 
“synergistic combination of four major ‘NBIC’.” The main 
question addressed in this paper is whether we can legiti-
mately label the NBIC vision “interdisciplinary”. The ques-
tion is not easy to answer because “ID” appears to be a va-
gue term. In this paper I will try to clarify the meanings of 
and contribute to the expanding discourse on inter- and 
transdisciplinarity in present-day knowledge politics. Refer-
ring to well-established distinctions in the philosophy of 
sciences and technology, this paper argues in favor of a plu-
rality of four different types that specify related but distin-
guishable meanings: ID with regard to (a) concepts/theories 
(epistemology), (b) methods/practices (methodology), (b) 
objects (ontology), and further, (d) purpose setting/problem 
framing/problem solving. By this categorization, I will criti-
cally clarify and assess the specific type of ID that is in-
volved in the NBIC scenario. I will deconstruct and assess 
the knowledge politics by analytic clarification in order to 
enable a stimulating of a public discourse. 
 
Now, in the following, I sketch some ideas of the NSF’s 
NBIC report (next paragraph). By referring to well-establi-
shed distinctions in the philosophy of sciences I will propose 
a classification scheme of four different types of ID. – Next I 
will show that the NSF’s knowledge politics is based on ob-
ject-ID, more specifically as techno-object ID which advo-
cates a technologically related reductionism. – Then, the 
techno-object ID of the NSF’s knowledge politics will be 
compared and contrasted with an explicit normative ap-
proach, the problem-oriented ID of the European Commis-
sion initiative on converging technologies (CTEKS). – I will 
conclude that a critical reflection on and revision of goals 
and purposes should guide the knowledge politics towards 
our common future. 
 
1. CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES …  
In the classic report on “Converging Technologies” the U.S.-
National Science Foundation (NSF) aims to advocate a spe-
cific type of ID [8]. Let us analysis this in more detail.   
ID appears to be the key element in the NSF’s NBIC 
vision to combine, converge and unify the engineering and 
natural sciences. The focus of the NSF is on engineering 
sciences and on a science-based technological shaping of the 
world—including the human body. The NSF begins the re-
port by analyzing the deficits of engineering sciences. Hither-
to, engineering sciences largely form a patchwork of very 
different areas such as civil, electrical, mechanical, material, 
informational, and medical engineering. In consequence, 
classical technologies are bounded technologies that are ap-
plied in specific contexts, e.g., biomedical technologies in the 
field of medicine or information technologies in the context 
of information processing, management and storage. Specia-
lization has splintered engineering sciences. None of the dis-
ciplines can master more than a tiny isolated fragment of all 
problems. Over the last 60 years, efforts have been made to 
bring together the various parts of science-based technolo-
gies—e.g., the earlier attempts of cybernetics in the 1940’s 
such as general systems theory, information theory, solid-
state physics; and also micro systems technology in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
There has been, however, little overall progress until 
now. Engineering sciences remain a patchwork. In fact, dis-
ciplinary and subdisciplinary boundaries between engineering 
sciences restrict the pace of invention and innovation. Boun-
daries limit the development of new methods and new tech-
nologies. “The traditional tool kit of engineering methods will 
be of limited utility in some of the most important areas of 
technological convergence.” [9] The NSF aims to overcome 
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the apparent limitation of traditional engineering methods by 
seeking a common technoscientific fundament assumed to 
underlay all the engineering sciences. Technoscience is an 
ideal term to highlight the merging of engineering sciences, 
natural science and technology. Such a deeper fundament 
should help to transgress the boundaries between the various 
engineering sciences and between engineering and natural 
sciences and, thus, it should foster inventions and innova-
tions. The NSF’s vision can be interpreted as an attempt to 
facilitate a foundation of engineering sciences on a deeper 
level similar to the foundation of physics and the unification 
project. Such a fundament, which can be called “enabling 
technologies” [10] will have enormous power for technologi-
cal development in general. Enabling technologies are 
thought to be rooted at a deeper level; enabling technologies 
are basic, fundament, and mother technologies that create, 
construct, and foster particular technologies in applied 
branches.  
ID is interlaced with unity metaphysics. The NSF ex-
plicitly highlights the need for “unifying science and con-
verging technologies” in order to “improve human perfor-
mance” [11]. From a philosophical point of view, it is surpris-
ing that the NSF’s vision seems to be rooted in a very tradi-
tional metaphysical claim regarding a “unity of nature” that 
reveals a strong naturalism. “In the early decades of the 21st 
century, concentrated efforts can unify science based on the 
unity of nature, thereby advancing the combination of nano-
technology, biotechnology, information technology, and new 
technologies based on cognitive sciences.” [12] Although the 
NSF report does not define “unity of nature”—it just men-
tions the “unified cause-and-effect understanding of the phys-
ical world“ (ibid)—the unity seems to provide a reason why a 
unification of science is possible and why an advancement of 
technoscience is feasible.  
ID, unity, and synergism are often used interchange-
ably. The NSF report follows this common understanding. ID 
means a “unification of sciences” and a “synergistic combina-
tion” of technologies. “The phrase ‘convergent technologies’ 
refers to the synergistic combination of four major ‘NBIC’ 
(nano-bio-info-cogno) provinces of science and technology, 
each of which is currently progressing at a rapid rate.” [13] 
Interchangeable with “ID”, the term “synergetic” is one of the 
most popular terms in contemporary knowledge politics. 
Coined by the physicist Hermann Haken in the late 1960s, the 
term has become tremendously popular. According to Haken, 
the main principle of synergetics is the “enslavement prin-
ciple” as it occurs in the creation of a laser beam. Due to 
small differences in initiate conditions caused by fluctuations, 
one mode will become the “master” that “enslaves all other 
modes”. Consequently, just a few order parameters are suffi-
cient to describe a complex system such as a laser.  
“Unity” means here that many variables of the com-
plex system can be reduced to a few order parameters. Ac-
cording to these considerations, in NSF’s understanding of 
“converging technologies” one technology enslaves the oth-
ers. The symmetry of four NBIC technologies is broken. One 
technology turns out to be the dominant master. Nanotech-
nology seems to be the fundamental basis for the unification 
of technologies. The abstract nanoscale and the material na-
noobjects are the locus where the convergence of the four 
technologies is supposed to take place: “Convergence of di-
verse technologies is based on material unity at nanoscale and 
on technological integration from that scale. The building 
blocks of matter that are fundamental to all sciences originate 
at nanoscale.” [14] Nanoobjects are at the center of the syn-
ergistic unification. Everything seems to converge into the 
very small and abstract world of the nanocosm.  
Convergence is not the final result but a process. It is 
the pacemaker to unity; unity is the final point, which is the 
point of total control, something like Archimedes’ “place to 
stand on” to “move the Earth”. Convergence means a conver-
gence of technosciences to nanotechnology and of technolo-
gical artifacts to nanotechnological artifacts. The metaphor of 
“convergence” is related to catchwords such as “holistic 
view” and “holism”. “Converging of the sciences can initiate 
a new renaissance, embodying a holistic view of technology 
based on transformative tools, the mathematics of complex 
systems, and unified cause-and-effect understanding of the 
physical world from the nanoscale to the planetary scale.” 
[15] Here, the NSF report renews the traditional metaphysical 
view of continuous causality and a causal nature in order to 
open up a new (old) horizon of technoscientifc possibilities. 
The vision of the NSF report also involves social sciences 
and humanities. The NSF believes in the possibility “to de-
velop a predictive science of society.” [16] ID in this broad 
sense does not only encompass natural and engineering 
sciences but all disciplines. “A trend towards unifying know-
ledge by combining natural sciences, social sciences, and 
humanities using cause-and-effect explanation has already 
begun.” [17] Social systems and human behavior seem to be 
explainable by causality. What works in the domain of nature 
is presupposed to work in the domain of social systems too.  
The NSF report also assumes that nanobased technol-
ogies will change society positively and dramatically. “Con-
verging technologies could achieve a tremendous improve-
ment in human abilities, societal outcomes, the nation’s prod-
uctivity, and the quality of life.” [18] A “new renaissance” 
and a “next industrial revolution” will emerge. This optimism 
seems to be at the core of the knowledge politics of the NSF’s 
NBIC advocates. As the classical renaissance period was, 
indeed, a technologically driven transition phase between the 
medieval times and the modern times, such a talk about a 
“new renaissance” equates any science-based technological 
progress with human and societal progress. The NSF report 
does not seem to be too far away from the idea of “moderni-
ty” that was developed in the 17th century. NSF’s vision, 
therefore, is neither unique nor novel. It can be traced back to 
the politician and philosopher Francis Bacon and the optim-
ism of his contemporaries.  
The NSF’s paradigm on converging technologies is 
nothing less than a renaissance of classical reductionism. Al-
though there is no longer the intention to reduce everything to 
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physics, or chemistry, we can identify a sort of “neutral (non- 
or inter-disciplinary) reductionism”. The NSF states: “Some 
partisans for independence of biology, psychology, and the 
social sciences have argued against ‘reductionism’, asserting 
that their fields had discovered autonomous truths that should 
not be reduced to the laws of other sciences. But such a dis-
cipline-centric outlook is self-defeating, because as this report 
makes clear, through recognizing their connections with each 
other, all the sciences can progress more effectively.” [19]   
 
For opening Pandora’s Box of ID knowledge politics, a criti-
cal reflection on knowledge, methods, objects, and problems 
is indispensable; contents and contexts are important to con-
sider.  
 
2. DIFFERENT NOTIONS OF ID 
Nearly all who speak of “interdisciplinarity” (ID) in scientific  
or public debates are pursuing goals. They do not aim only to 
describe science. Rather, they intend to change, to renew and 
to re-structure sciences, and to shape science-based technolo-
gies and societies. Referring to interdisciplinarity, Erich 
Jantsch advocated the “self-renewal of society” [20]  in the 
1970s, today Jan Fagerberg stresses “innovation” and “long-
term economic growth” [21]. Normativity is always involved. 
Interdisciplinarity does not aim to leave disciplines (and dis-
ciplinarity) unaffected and society untouched. An implicit 
societal theory—how to understand contemporary techno-
scientific societies and how to shape the societal future—is 
always present when “interdisciplinarity” appears. Interdis-
ciplinarity is an eminently political term: a core element of 
present-day “knowledge politics” [22].  
A critical reflection on the way in which the NBIC 
advocates of the Roco-Bainbridge-report use the term “inter-
disciplinarity” should start with an analytical classification. In 
addition to what has been achieved in the field of reflection 
on interdisciplinarity, I will propose a classification frame-
work of different types of interdisciplinarity [23]. A plurality 
of meanings will be shown, without a unifying semantic core. 
There is not one type of interdisciplinarity—and not one kind 
or one overall goal of interdisciplinary knowledge politics—
but various types coexist.  
 
Object ID:  Entities or objects constitute the central elements 
of object-interdisciplinarity (ontological dimension of ID). 
The historically established functional differentiation into 
disciplines does not seem to be contingent. Rather, it mirrors 
aspects of the structure of reality. Edmund Husserl, Nicolai 
Hartmann, and Alfred North Whitehead argue in favor of a 
concept of layered reality. Boundaries between the layers 
separate the micro-, meso- and macrocosm. Interdisciplinary 
objects are thought to be located on boundaries between dif-
ferent cosms or within border zones between disciplines, for 
example, the brain-mind object. In order to substantiate this 
position one has to presuppose a minimal ontological realism, 
interlaced with a concept of layered reality, and, based on 
this, an ontological non-reductionism: Brain-mind objects can 
be reduced neither to the material brain nor to the mental 
mind but, perhaps, to other entities (neutral ontology). Old 
and ongoing philosophical issues about monism, dualism and 
pluralism emerge in this debate. ID here does not refer mainly 
to knowledge, methods or problems, but to an external, hu-
man-independent reality.  
The foregoing position is a strong one. It might be 
called universal object ID. A weaker position—which can be 
named real-constructivist or techno-object ID—does not as-
sert a timeless existence of interdisciplinary objects in an un-
changeable reality but rather that interdisciplinary objects are 
created by human action.  Examples include the hole in the 
ozone layer, or—as we will see later on in much more de-
tail—techno-objects of nanoscience: nanoobjects are placed 
on the boundaries between physics, chemistry, biology, and 
engineering sciences. This ontological position is neither a 
classic cognitive-oriented realist’s position nor a constructiv-
ist one: it can be called real-constructivism and it traces back 
to Bacon, and more recent, to Ian Hacking [24]. Unfortunate-
ly, however, real constructivism is not fully developed in 
philosophy of science.  
 
 Theory ID focuses on knowledge, theories, and concepts, 
and not primarily on objects and reality. It is concerned with 
whether interdisciplinary theories exist and how they may be 
specified. Can we demarcate interdisciplinary knowledge 
from disciplinary knowledge and from non-scientific know-
ledge? Is there a unique context of justification? Do interdis-
ciplinary models, laws, descriptions, and explanations exist? 
Possible candidates for theory-ID are concepts which can be 
applied to describe objects in different disciplinary domains; 
they highlight structural similarities between properties of 
these objects. Such theories cannot be reduced to disciplinary 
ones. Theory-ID is, therefore, based on an epistemological 
non-reductionism. 
Structural sciences such as complex systems theory 
are prominent examples [25], [26]. Structurally similar 
process phenomena—e.g., pattern formation, self organiza-
tion, bifurcations, structure breaking, and catastrophes—can 
be found in different disciplinary branches. The objective is 
an integration of general structures regardless of the discipli-
nary content. Alike theories are self-organization theory, dis-
sipative structures, synergetics, chaos theory, and fractal 
geometry. Hermann Haken regards synergetics as an “inter-
disciplinary theory of general interactions” [27]. Most of 
these interdisciplinary theories were established in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Basic ideas—and the term “structural sciences”—, 
however, can be found in works from the 1940s and 1950s. 
Structural sciences “study their objects regardless of discipli-
nary domains and in abstraction from disciplinary content” 
[28]. Classic examples are cybernetics, information theory or 
game theory. 
 
Method ID refers to knowledge production, to research pro-
cesses, to rule-based actions, and to languages. The central 
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issue of methodology is how, and by which rule, can and 
should we obtain knowledge? In terms of interdisciplinarity, 
central questions are: Do interdisciplinary methods and ac-
tions exist? Is there a specific context of discovery within 
interdisciplinary projects? Interdisciplinary methodologies, 
however, are thought to be irreducible to a disciplinary me-
thodology.  
Biomimicry, for example—sometimes used inter-
changeably with bionics—claims to be an interdisciplinary 
transfer methodology from biology to engineering sciences 
[29]. The basic idea of biomimicry is “learning from nature” 
in order to “inspire technological innovations.” Nature seems 
to provide excellent inventions that can be used to develop 
efficient technologies. However, the transfer is not a one-way 
street. Biomimicry constructs models of biological nature 
based on the perspective of engineering sciences. A robot 
mimics an ant, but at the same time the ant has been de-
scribed from the mechanistic perspective of technology. Be-
sides biomimicry, there are other examples of interdiscipli-
nary methodologies. Econophysics methodologically orga-
nizes a transfer between physics and finance/economics 
[30].—In addition to these transfer methodologies, a new 
kind of non- or meta-disciplinary methodology of knowledge 
production has emerged over the past 50 years: mathematical 
modeling and computer-based simulations. Modeling tools 
and simulation techniques are not only applied in various 
disciplines—for instance, in order to reduce the costs of expe-
rimentation or to improve the prediction accuracy—, but they 
are also pragmatically used an developed to integrate know-
ledge from different disciplinary domains.       
 
 Problem- and purpose-oriented ID: We have to add another 
type that focuses on the starting points and goals, problems 
and purposes of research programs—in other words, the 
problem framing and agenda setting type. Erich Jantsch ar-
gues in favor of a “purposive level of interdisciplinarity” and 
a “purpose-oriented interdisciplinarity”, today sometimes 
called “transdisciplinarity”. An explicit reflection on, and 
revision of, purposes should be regarded as the highest level 
of interdisciplinarity [31]. Juergen Habermas draws attention 
to the aims in connection with the kick-off of a particular 
research program [32]. Normative premises, such as problem 
identifying and agenda setting, the volition or intention to 
obtain certain knowledge, precede both the context of discov-
ery and the context of justification, i.e., the theories and the 
methods.  
The very first step in scientific inquiry is often 
judged to be a contingent factor; the teleological structure in 
the process of knowledge production is not always acknowl-
edged. In fact, philosophers of science have widely ignored 
problem identifying or agenda setting, although work has 
been done on “wicked problems”. The lack of clarification is 
a disadvantage for specifying problem-oriented ID and de-
marcating it from disciplinarity. Obviously, interdisciplinary 
problems are external to disciplines and to sciences in gener-
al. They are primarily societal and are defined by society, 
e.g., lay people, politicians, and stakeholders. To contribute 
to societal problem solving and to ensure societal progress, 
disciplinary limitations have to be overcome. In this sense ID 
is seen as an instrument meeting societal demands in order to 
tackle pressing problems. Examples of problem-oriented ID 
are sustainability research, technology assessment, and social 
ecology [33].  
 
One or other of the above-listed types of ID may raise con-
cerns. Underlying philosophical convictions determine which 
type might be considered most important and which of the 
other types will just be viewed as mere inferences. Even in 
the new field of knowledge politics, (implicit) philosophical 
convictions play a role.  
Regarding well-established positions in the philoso-
phy of science, we can denote: (1) Realists and real-
constructivist refer to given or constructed objects of reality 
(they prefer the ontological dimension of ID). (2) Rationalists 
focus on knowledge, theories, and concepts; positivists share 
the same orientation toward theories (epistemological dimen-
sion). (3) Methodological constructivists and many prag-
matists reflect on methods, actions, or cognitive rules (me-
thodological dimension). (4) Critical theorists, together with 
instrumentalists, utilitarians and some pragmatists, refer to 
problems and how to handle and solve problems pragmatical-
ly. The impact, effect, and consequence of ID are of utmost 
relevance (problem-oriented dimension). 
The different approaches to interdisciplinarity de-
pend on underlying philosophical convictions. We cannot 
eliminate this plurality. “ID” is, and will always be, a multi-
faceted term—open to any kind of political shaping. Philoso-
phy of science is effectively helpful in analyzing and classify-
ing interdisciplinarity. 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE ID-FRAMEWORK  
AND KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT  
Now we are ready to address the question of which type of 
interdisciplinarity is most dominant in the Roco-Bainbridge-
report: which kind of interdisciplinarity is the objective of 
this report? To state it plainly, the report does not have much 
to offer with regard to theories and methods, and it offers 
only marginal aspects with regard to problems and purposes.  
 
Theory ID: A patchwork of models would work well if it 
provided a sufficient and an efficient basis for technological 
interventions. A coherent and consistent theory is not the aim 
of the Roco-Bainbridge-report and the NBIC scenario; theo-
ries are not regarded as ends in themselves: rather, they are 
means and instruments. Theories are judged by the question 
of whether they actually contribute to the development of 
new technologies—or not. They are not in themselves supe-
rior to models. To put it briefly: technology is the aim, not 
theory; technological intervention instead of theoretical re-
presention. – On the other hand, the Roco-Bainbridge-report 
realizes that theoretical elements are indispensable. The pat-
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chwork of present-day engineering science limits progress. In 
order to promote engineering science and to develop enabling 
technologies, we have to “integrate what is happening.” [34] 
Nothing turns out to be more practical than an adequate 
theory. In fact, the theoretical orientation for the sake of prac-
tical relevance makes the NBIC scenario an excellent exam-
ple of a “technoscience” [35]. Natural sciences, engineering 
sciences, and technology are merging. Because of its practical 
and pragmatic orientation, however, the Roco-Bainbridge-
report pursues only a weak understanding of theory. A theory 
is not understood in the sense of a deductive-nomological 
type of explanation that is still the underlying objective of the 
unification project of physics. Thus, the report is hesitant and 
prefers to talk about the integration of knowledge, models 
and concepts rather than about a theory. – In addition, let us 
look at theories from another perspective. Assume for the 
moment—contrary to what I have elaborated so far—that 
theories were the aim of the NBIC scenario. Then, let us ask: 
Are the NBIC-technologies successful? Not at all! It is hard 
to see any common theoretical umbrella or any interdiscipli-
nary theory in the NBIC scenario—even if we refer to the 
weak understanding of theory. Certainly we find progress 
regarding theories within the branch of disciplinary (nano-) 
physics. But in the context of theories the progress of nano-
physics can hardly be called “interdisciplinary”.  
 
Method ID: A common method and a unified methodology 
are not the aim of the Roco-Bainbridge-report. Methods are 
regarded as means and instruments to obtain knowledge. 
What matters most is the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
methods in general, not any process of unification. If unifica-
tion can help to increase efficiency, it is highly desired. How-
ever, the methods we find in the NBIC-branch are based on 
advancements in the realm of physics; some trace back to 
chemistry and molecular biology. A physicist, Richard Feyn-
man, gave the first programmatic speech on nanotechnology 
in 1959. He declared that there seems to be “plenty of room at 
the bottom”. The NBIC-technologies are mainly driven by 
methodological improvements in the area of physics. For the 
rise of nanotechnology, new physical instruments such as the 
scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) and the atomic force 
microscope (AFM) are of major importance. They stem from 
advanced developments of physics in the early 1980’s. If the 
core of the NBIC scenario is rooted in nanotechnology, then 
it is rooted in disciplinary physics, or in molecular biology.  
 
Problem- and purpose-oriented ID: So, the NBIC-conver-
gence can hardly be regarded as problem-oriented. It is main-
ly technoobject-oriented. Only very general and unspecific 
goals are formulated, such as such as human enhancement 
and fulfilling the basic needs of the LDC. The term “new 
renaissance” seems to be nothing but a metaphor. The general 
goals lack of very content. In contrast, problem-orientation 
means to deliberately set goals, reflect on and revise purpos-
es. Problem-oriented ID intends to focus on, to frame and to 
solve societal problems by explicitly reflecting on goals—and 
partly by making use of and developing new technologies. 
The Roco-Bainbridge-report does not explicate or attempt to 
initiate a discourse about purposes. However, the report 
seems to be fascinated by the technological development in 
itself, interlaced with the unspecific idea of human enhance-
ment: opening opportunities without orientation. For instance, 
the Roco-Bainbridge-report does not have broad reservations 
with regard to military uses. An improvement of converging 
technologies for battlefield domination does not seem to be 
undesirable. Thus, the Roco-Bainbridge-report does not fit 
into the reflexive concept of problem-oriented ID (see also 
the last section of this paper).  
 
Object ID: Until now my findings have been negative—there 
is a lack of theory- and method-ID and a very limited, if any, 
problem-oriented ID. What can be said about object-ID? Ac-
cording to my definition in paragraph 3.1, we have to take 
two different kinds of object-interdisciplinary into account. 
(a) The strong version assumes objects to be time-invariantly 
located on boundaries due to the universal layers of reality 
(universal object-ID). Following the underlying ontological 
realism, these objects were called interdisciplinary objects. 
(b) A weaker version states that the boundaries have not ex-
isted and do not exist for ever (partial or realconstructivistic 
object-ID). Boundaries are constructed by the way humans 
construct reality. Humans construct boundaries and create 
objects on boundaries—in short: material boundary-objects. 
In fact, the objects of the NBIC scenario are the created and 
constructed nanotechnological objects. They have not existed 
before and do not exist independently in Nature, independent 
of humans, although they are based on the laws of Nature: 
e.g., new materials, new products and processes. According 
to the Roco-Bainbridge-report, nanoobjects seem to be the 
fundamental basis for converging technologies. This is a con-
vergence in objects, not in theories, methods, or problems. 
The scale of the nanotechnoobject is where the convergence 
of the four technologies is supposed to take place: “Conver-
gence of diverse technologies is based on material unity at 
nanoscale and on technological integration from that scale. 
The building blocks of matter are fundamental to all 
sciences.” [36] In the very small and realconstructed world of 
the nanocosm, everything seems to converge. From this pers-
pective, the nanotechnoobjects can be labeled “interdiscipli-
nary”. – It is interesting to see how the realconstructed na-
noobjects relate to physics. On the one hand, nanotechnoob-
jects belong to the domain of physics; they are located on 
boundaries between the quantum microcosm and the meso-
cosm. On the other hand the Roco-Bainbridge-report aims to 
produce instrumental knowledge about and for enabling tech-
nologies, and not to obtain true objective knowledge, as in 
“old-fashioned” physics. Although the boundaries between 
physics and engineering sciences are highly disputed, it is 
worthwhile to stress that “converging technologies” does not 
mean a convergence to objects that belong to disciplinary 
physics but rather a convergence to technoscientific nanoob-
jects—that are objects for technological purposes. This is 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Georgia Institute of Technology. Downloaded on January 4, 2010 at 14:14 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
 7
why we do not have a reduction to disciplinary objects such 
as objects of physics in the NBIC scenario, but a reduction to 
interdisciplinary (realconstructed) objects. In this sense, na-
notechnoojects are located between physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, and some engineering sciences. Here, Richard Feynman, 
the early protagonist of nanotechnology, identified that 
“There is plenty of room at the bottom” for non-disciplinary 
Nanoobjects [37].  
 
Therefore, realconstructivistic technoobject-ID turns out to 
be underlying the NBIC scenario. The types of ID is not a 
very strong one [38]. The technoobjects seem to be at the 
core of the heterogeneous and diverse fields of the umbrella 
term “nanotechnology”, including electron-beam and ion-
beam fabrication, molecular-beam epitaxy, nanoimprint li-
thography, projection electron microscopy, atom-by-atom 
manipulation, quantum-effect electronics, semiconductor 
technology, spintronics, and microelectromechanical systems. 
Here, constructed and created interdisciplinary technobjects 
are essential parts of the present-day reality or the reality to 
come.  
 
4. CONTRASTING WITH CTEKS … 
Differences in knowledge politics are, however, obvious 
when we compare and contrast the NSF report with another 
prominent initiative. In 2004, an expert group of the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) developed “a specifically European 
approach to converging technologies” [39]. The EC group 
released a report entitled “Converging Technologies: Shaping 
the Future of European Societies”, in detail: Converging 
Technologies for the European Knowledge Society (CTEKS). 
The Europeans do not focus mainly on human enhancement 
but on broader aspects of societal innovation. 
The EC group highly values ID, just as the NSF 
does. The European approach, however, advocates ID in a 
much broader understanding. The EC group considers plural 
perspectives and speaks about “Nano-Bio-Cogno-Socio-
Anthro-Philo-Geo-Eco-Urbo-Orbo-Macro-Micro”. Rather 
than striving for a convergence to/of techno-objects, technol-
ogies, or technosciences, the EC group aims to foster a con-
verging “towards a common goal. CTs [ = Converging Tech-
nologies] always involve an element of agenda setting. Be-
cause of this, converging technologies are particularly open 
to the deliberate inclusion of public and policy concerns. De-
liberate agenda setting for CTs can therefore be used to ad-
vance strategic objectives such as the Lisbon Agenda.” [40] 
The societal goals, purposes, and aims are at the core of the 
EC’s understanding of ID, in particular the setting of the 
goals. Here, ID encompasses deliberate goal setting. Norma-
tivity is explicated by the CTEKS-approach. A explicit reflec-
tion on and revision of processes of “normative setting of 
goals”—as a basic element of “interdisciplinary excel-
lence”—is intended [41]. To realize this, the European 
“CTEKS-research programs require and produce new stan-
dards for interdisciplinary research. ID usually means that 
researchers from various disciplines pool intellectual and 
technical resources as they address a problem together. This 
form of ID is insufficient when the CTEKS agenda-setting 
process requires critical and comparative assessments of the 
viability of proposals. Mutual criticism across disciplinary 
boundaries is required [...]. Funding incentives for collabora-
tive research is not enough to produce this kind of ID.” [42]  
The EC stresses elements of participatory gover-
nance and technoscientific citizenship. Not only experts but 
also lay people should participate in this public process. 
“CTEKS agenda-setting is not top-down but integrated into 
the creative technology development process. Beginning with 
scientific interest and technological expertise, it works from 
the inside out in close collaboration with the social and hu-
man sciences and multiple stakeholders through the proposed 
WiCC-initiative (‘widening the Circles of Convergence’). For 
the same reason, ethical and social considerations are not 
external and purely reactive but through the proposed EuroS-
pecs process bring awareness to CT research and develop-
ment.” [43] Statements such as the foregoing are an excellent 
explication of problem-oriented ID. They represent a clear 
contrast to techno-object ID favored by the NSF report. The 
EC’s idea to widen “the Circles of Convergence” means to 
reject the techno-object orientation, the metaphysical unity-
of-nature metaphor of NSF’s approach, and the cause-and-
effect terminology. Broader aspects of the “Socio-Anthro-
Philo-Geo-Eco [...]” are taken into account. Different kinds of 
convergence are worth thinking about, and, according to the 
EC group, they should be adjusted after the process of (nor-
mative) goal finding and agenda setting.  
The EC group regards ethical considerations in public 
discourses as guidelines to shape the trajectories towards our 
common future(s). These trajectories should be intentionally 
set and selected in order to meet societal goals, cultural 
needs, and ethical standards. The EC group offers 16 recom-
mendations; among them is the very central “ID” which is 
much more than simply an organizational principle. “ID 
should be strengthened, beyond planned or institutional col-
laboration, in program calls and research policies from the 
Commission and from the European nations.” [44] Further: 
“CT modules should be introduced at secondary and higher 
education levels to synergize disciplinary perspectives and to 
foster interaction between liberal arts and the sciences.“ [45] 
“Commission and Member States need to recognize and sup-
port the contributions of the social sciences and humanities in 
relation to CTs, with commitments especially to evolutionary 
anthropology, the economics of technological research and 
development, foresight methodologies and philosophy.” [46] 
The EC group is not arguing in favor of the naturalization of 
social sciences and the humanities. They are very reluctant to 
speak about a unity of nature, integration, a unity of science 
and cause-and-effect-explanations.  
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SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
We can distinguish four different types of ID in recent 
knowledge politics: the object type, the knowledge/theory 
type, the method/process type, and the problem/purpose 
type. By making use of analytical classification, I have 
shown that a specific type of ID is involved in the Roco-
Bainbridge-report on converging technologies.  
The comparison of the two contrasting visions of 
Converging Technologies might provide a further argument 
that the classification of the four different types of ID is a 
helpful analytic tool to investigate research programs and 
recent knowledge politics. Technoobject-ID and problem-
oriented-ID are very different. This distinction might serve 
as a cornerstone for critically assessing the fluid buzzword 
“ID” in the various contexts of recent knowledge politics: 
Understanding interdisciplinarity turns out to be indispensa-
ble for the possibility of a normative assessment and adjust-
ment of knowledge politics: Reflection on interdisciplinarity 
is the basis for a revision of knowledge politics. A critical 
revision of knowledge politics seems to be one of the major 
policy fields in our late-modern societies. Shaping interdis-
ciplinary knowledge seems to be a central element for build-
ing late-modern societies. A Reinvention of Politics (Ulrich 
Beck) and a normative discourse on what is worth know-
ing—as Knowledge Politics of Interdisciplinarity—is indis-
pensable in order to cope with pressing problems. Late-
modern societies are faced with far reaching political ques-
tions: What kind of knowledge is necessary for the future of 
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